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Abstract 
Watermarking is the process of embedding information into a carrier file for the protection of 
ownership/copyright of digital media, whilst steganography is the art of hiding information. This paper 
presents, a hybrid steganographic watermarking algorithm based on Discrete Wavelet Transform 
(DWT) and Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) transforms in order to enhance the security of digital 
fingerprint images. A facial watermark is embedded into fingerprint image using a method of singular 
value replacement. First, the DWT is used to decompose the fingerprint image from the spatial domain 
to the frequency domain and then the facial watermark is embedded in singular values (SV’s) obtained 
by application of SVD. In addition, the original fingerprint image is not required to extract the 
watermark. Experimental results provided demonstrate the methods robustness to image degradation 
and common signal processing attacks, such as histogram and filtering, noise addition, JPEG and 
JPEG2000 compression with various levels of quality.  
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1. Introduction 
Biometric systems allow for convenient identification to take place based on a person’s 
physical or behavioural characteristics. Biometric procedures have evolved rapidly in the past 
decade and are used in many different areas, such as banking and government agencies, retail 
sales, law enforcement, health services, and airport/border controls [1]. One of the main 
reasons that these biometric mechanisms are gaining popularity is because of their ability to 
distinguish between an authorized user and a deceptive one [2]. At present, fingerprint 
biometrics are said to be the most common mechanism, as these are convenient to use, and 
cheaper to maintain in comparison to other systems. However, as the development of these 
applications continues to expand, the matter of security and confidentiality cannot be ignored. 
The security and integrity of biometric data presents a major challenge, as many benefits of 
biometrics may quite easily become impediment. Thus, from the point of view of promoting the 
extensive usage of biometric techniques, the necessity of safeguarding biometric data, in 
particular fingerprint data becomes crucial [3]. For example, fingerprint biometric systems 
contain sensitive information such as minutia points which is used to uniquely identify a 
fingerprint. The use of latent fingerprints is one way that an unauthorized user can access a 
system. A latent fingerprint can be easily collected as people leave latent prints when they touch 
hard surfaces.  If an unauthorized user was successful in retrieving a latent print it may enable 
him/her to gain access to the system hence potentially endanger the privacy of users. 
Additionally, stolen data may be used for illegal purposes, such as identity theft, forgery or 
fraud. Therefore, increased security of the data is critical [4]. 
Information hiding techniques like watermarking and steganography can add to the 
security of biometric systems. Watermarking is a process of embedding information into a 
carrier file in order to secure copyright, typically ownership. Watermarks can be either visible or 
nonvisible to the human eye. Steganography is the process of hiding critical data (i.e. identity 
pin) in a trusted carrier medium (i.e. digital fingerprint image) without third parties sharing any 
awareness that the information exists. Both methods of information hiding are closely  
connected [5]. Over the past number of years, many image-based steganography methods 
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have been broadly classified depending upon the domain as spatial domain steganography and 
frequency domain steganography. In Spatial domain steganography, methods such as 
correlation based techniques and LSB substitution, which will be explained later, have been 
developed and tested.  Frequency domain steganography methods consist of many different 
domains, such as Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) domain, Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) 
domain, Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) domain, Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), etc. 
These techniques are discussed in detail in later sections. Frequency domain methods are 
considered to be more robust than that of spatial domain methods [6]. Frequency domain 
methods have been used in combination with other techniques, this approach is known as 
hybrid steganography. Many of these hybrid techniques make use of a mathematical 
decomposition called the Singular Value Decomposition. SVD is considered to be one of the 
most valuable numerical analysis tools available, mainly because singular values obtain 
inherent algebraic properties and provide stability that permits secret data to be hidden without 
degrading the perceptual quality of an image [7]. In this study, a wavelet based watermarking 
algorithm is proposed to enhance the security of fingerprint images. The algorithm embeds 
secret data into a fingerprint image based on Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) and Singular 
Value Decomposition (SVD). The fingerprint image is first converted to the frequency domain 
and the SVD is applied on both the original fingerprint image and the watermark image. The 
singular values (SV’s) of the fingerprint image are then modified with the singular values (SV’s) 
of the secret image. 
 
 
2. A secure Fingerprint Recognition System 
Data hiding algorithms are generally based on either substitution or quantisation 
procedure, and pixel bits or coefficients are manipulated in order to conceal data. Research 
shows that many frequency domain algorithms exceed that of the spatial domain. However, 
spatial domain techniques do possess some advantages over frequency domains, for instance, 
its large capacity to hide data. Nonetheless, the negative points of embedding in the spatial 
domain, such as its poor robustness to attacks, outweigh the positive ones.  Even though, the 
majority of methods mentioned in the literature review suggest that frequency domain methods 
are deemed a more appropriate method, disadvantages also exist. In frequency domain 
embedding the capacity for hiding data is much less than that of the spatial domain. For 
instance, using DWT as an example, and a bitmap image size 512x512, which is decomposed 
at first level (i.e. LL, LH, HL, HH), the maximum message or watermark size would be 256x256. 
Moreover if decomposed further (i.e. LL1, LH1, HL1, HH1), the maximum message or 
watermark size would be 128x128. Furthermore, depending on how and where the data is 
hidden, applying compression on the image may cause the hidden message or watermark to be 
badly distorted or unreadable. When an image is compressed most of the energy stored in the 
high frequency sub-bands are removed, so if a message or watermark is hidden in these sub 
bands it may be lost. [8] proposed a method to exploit the wavelet domain by hiding information 
(watermark image) in the sub-band coefficients of the mid frequency band of an image to 
produce a stego image. Image quality tests carried out showed positive results. However, after 
testing the algorithms robustness against jpeg compression, results proved disappointing. 
Although the results against compression in [9] were unsatisfactory, it is important to note that 
many other proposed methods based on wavelet embedding have shown encouraging 
outcomes against compression attacks [9]. It is also important to highlight that loss of hidden 
data may greatly depend upon where data is concealed in the first place. For example, the low 
frequency sub-bands (LL) contain the majority of image energy which makes up an image, 
therefore when compression is applied; most of this information is kept intact. So, if data is 
embedded in low frequency sub-band the probability of it surviving compression is high. 
Nevertheless, embedding in low sub-bands can degrade image quality and thus lead to 
unwanted attention from attacker. On the other hand, embedding data in the higher frequency 
coefficients have a greater expectancy of data loss after compression is applied, as information 
contained within higher sub-bands only hold small amounts of image information, most of which 
is disregarding during compression. It is clear, that determining the correct hiding locations here 
is critical, particularly if durability against compression is a requirement of the system. Recent 
studies show that the use of singular value decomposition in combination with other frequency 
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domains for hiding data can further enhance an algorithm, with regard to image quality and 
security [7].  
 
2.1 The Algorithm 
Our approach adopts a combination of two effective transform methods, namely, DWT 
and SVD. DWT decomposes the image into four frequency bands: LL (low frequency), HL, LH 
(mid-frequency), and HH (high-frequency). The HH band is selected to embed the secret data 
as it holds only minor details, and its contribution is almost insignificant to the energy of the 
image, thus data embedding will not disturb the perceptual fidelity of the cover image. 
Furthermore, low frequency sub-bands (LL) can only be altered to a certain extent; otherwise it 
would have a serious impact on image quality [10] observed that the Human Visual System 
(HVS) fails to differentiate changes made to the HH band. This algorithm presents a procedure 
which will replace the singular values of the HH sub-band with the singular values of the secret 
image. The singular values of the HH band of 5 test images are presented in Table 1. Notice 
that the singular values are somewhere between 92 and 177. If the singular values of the 
chosen secret image lie within a similar range, then no significant degradation to the cover 
image will occur, due to the SV’s of hidden image being similar to those of the HH band.  
 
 
Table 1. Singular values of HH frequency band of different test images 
 
 
 
All images used for the purposes of experimentation were taken from the Fingerprint 
Verification Competition (FVC2004) database [11] and the Yale Face Database B [12]. The Yale 
website contains many databases, however only the B database is authorized for research 
purposes. The use of other databases first, requires permission. Prior to embedding, Adobe 
Photoshop was used to alter all images to a specific size (512x512) and format (bitmap), the 
size of the facial images is also made identical to the size of the HH sub-band, where data 
embedding will take place. Preceeding data embedding, an important aspect concerning the 
feature extraction of fingerprint data must be considered. Features extracted from a fingerprint, 
namely minutiae, are used to determine a person’s identity. It is imperative that the locations of 
these important regions are not altered during the embedding stage [13]. To ensure these 
regions are not affected during the embedding stage, fingerprint minutia are identified and 
extracted from images before, and again, after embedding [14].  
 
2.2 Fingerprint Image Processing 
Fingerprints from the FVC database [11] were used therefore, no acquisition step is 
implemented. Image Binarization is applied to the fingerprint image. This process transforms the 
8-bit fingerprint image to 1-bit image. In general, an object pixel is given a value of “1” whereas 
a background pixel is given a value of “0.” Subsequently, a binary image is generated by 
shading pixels, either black or white (i.e. black for 0, white for 1). Here, a locally adaptive 
binarization method is performed using Matlab “im2bw” function. The approach used here 
divides the image into (16x16) blocks and calculates the mean intensity value for each block. 
Then, each pixel value is changed to “1” if its intensity value is greater than the mean intensity 
value of the current block, to which the pixel belongs to. After the fingerprint image is converted 
to binary form, a thinning algorithm is applied to reduce the ridge thickness to one pixel wide. In 
order to preserve fingerprint minutia, it is important that the thinning operation be performed 
without any modification being made to the original ridge. For this purpose, MATLAB’s built in 
morphological thinning function “bwmorph" is used. The “bwmorph” operation is based on the 
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following two principles, ridge end points are not removed and connected ridges are preserved. 
The function is applied as follows: bwmorph(binaryImage,'thin',inf) takes a binary image as 
input, applies the thinning procedure which in turn, outputs a skeletal binary image consisting of 
only one pixel wide. Figure 1 presents a fingerprint image before and after thinning. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Before and after thinning 
 
 
The aforementioned function uses an iterative, parallel thinning approach which scans 
over a (3x3) pixel window, checking the neighbourhood of a pixel based on a number of 
conditions [15]. Upon every scan of the fingerprint image, redundant pixels are marked down 
within each image window (3x3). After several scans, all marked pixels are removed thus 
providing a skeleton image. 
Succeeding binarization and thinning, the process of extracting fingerprint features is 
relatively straightforward. A concept known as crossing numbers (CN), originally proposed  
by [16] is used. This is an important step in fingerprint recognition, as the bifurcation and 
terminations will be determined. The crossing number concept is carried out based on a 3x3 
window, if the central pixel in the window is 1 and has only one-value neighbour, then the 
central pixel is an end-point (i.e. ridge ending/termination) presented in Figure 2(a). If the central 
pixel is 1 and has exactly 3 one-value neighbours, then it is a bifurcation as shown in Figure 
2(b). Finally, if the central is 1 and has 2 one-value as neighbours, then it is a non-minutia point 
as illustrated in Figure 2(c). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Indication of minutia points 
 
 
The pre-processed fingerprint image contains many false minutiae, such as breaks, 
spurs, bridges etc. illustrated by circles in Figure 5. This can be due to insufficient amounts of 
ink, which cause false ridge breaks, or over-inking in which ridges can cross-connect. It has also 
been noticed that some of the pre-processing stages carried out have added to the problem of 
false minutia. Spurious minutiae can have a significant impact on fingerprint recognition. For 
instance, if fake minutia is regarded as genuine, system accuracy will be poor. Therefore, it is 
an essential requirement that false minutiae are eliminated. For this purpose, the Euclidean 
distance method is used [17]. The 3 step process to remove false minutia is: 1) If the distance 
between a termination (end-points) and a bifurcation is smaller than D, this minutiae is removed; 
2) If the distance between two bifurcations is smaller than D, remove minutiae and 3) If the 
distance between two terminations is smaller than D, this minutia is also removed. Figure 3 
presents fingerprint images before (a) and after (b) removal of false minutiae. Note: terminations 
are circled in red, bifurcations in green. 
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(a)                (b) 
Figure 3. Fingerprint before (a) and after (b) removal of false minutiae 
 
 
After the removal of spurious minutia, features of the fingerprint image can be 
eliminated further. For example if we consider Figure 3(a), note that a lot of minutiae are 
contained around the edges, this is known as background information, often generated when 
the ridges are out of the sensor. To eliminate this area, a region of interest (ROI) is recognised 
for each fingerprint. This procedure was carried out using Morphological ROI tools from 
MATLAB [18]. 
The two operations used in ROI extraction are “OPEN” and “CLOSE”. The use of the 
‘OPEN’ function will expand the images by a specified size and eliminate existing background 
noise such as, peaks. The “CLOSE” function is then used to shrink the fingerprint images and 
close up any tiny holes or gaps that may exist within the image. The bound region is determined 
by the subtracting the closed area of the image from the opened area. Then the left, right, upper 
and bottom blocks are discarded, leaving only the inner area of the image, known here as 
region of interest which is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 
  
Figure 4. Region of Interest Figure 5. Fingerprint image after Region of 
Interest is applied 
 
 
After the ROI is defined, all minutiae external to this region are suppressed, as the 
important minutia lies only within the inner section of the image. Figure 5 presents a fingerprint 
image showing external and internal minutia after ROI is applied. Finally, minutia contained in 
the inner area of the image is saved to a text file.  
 
2.3 Securing fingerprints biometrics 
The next step of the algorithm is to secure the fingerprint biometric with the use of 
steganography. For this purpose, another piece of biometric data (facial image) is used. It is 
believed that embedding one biometric within another can further enhance the security of the 
system, as two forms of authentication will then exist [19]. The fingerprint image will be referred 
to as cover image, and the face image as secret image. When the secret image is embedded 
into the cover image, this will be introduced as the stego image. Figure 6 shows the embedding 
(a) and extraction (b) of secret data in the transform domain using the SVD technique. 
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Figure 6. Embedding (a) and Extraction (b) Algorithm 
 
 
After the embedding, the secret image was extracted and clearly recognizable. 
Modifying only the singular values of an image allows for the data to be extracted without the 
need for the original cover image. This has benefits in regards to security as the original image 
does not need to be stored. 
 
2.4 Image Attacks and Quality Measures 
In order to prove the robustness of the data embedding technique proposed, a series of 
attacks have been carried out on the stego fingerprint images. It is common to compare two 
images using PSNR (peak signal to noise ratio) based on the MSE (mean-squared error). 
However, if data is specifically embedded within the image edges or textured areas, PSNR is 
then an inefficient method to compute the quality of an image [20]. In [21], a selection of 
methods have been proposed to overcome PSNR disadvantages. An objective formula often 
used for comparability purposes is the Normalized Cross-Correlation (NCC). This metric is used 
to measure deflections between the extracted facial image (after attacks) with respect to the 
original facial image (prior to attacks). If the NCC value is equal to 1, then the embedded data 
and the extracted data are same. Typically, if the NCC value is greater than 0.7500, it is 
accepted as a reasonable data extraction. All of the above are important steps in order to 
enhance fingerprint security. The most decisive one being that minutia must still be extractable 
from the fingerprints after the data embedding procedure, and image attacks have been carried 
out. Even though the facial data extracted from the fingerprint is clear, it would be considered a 
failure if minutia was severely altered during data embedding in such a way that user 
authenticity would be affected. For this reason, all stego fingerprints (after embedding and 
attacks) are put through the feature extraction process, and minutia extracted before and after 
the steganography process is compared. There is no standard number of minutiae required in 
order to make a positive identification. In some cases, the decision as to whether or not the 
fingerprints match is left solely to the examiner. However, each individual department may hold 
their own set of requirements in order to establish a positive identification. Ireland follows what 
is known as an 8-point rule, meaning that 8 minutia points are required for a valid identification. 
Many European countries require no less than 12 points of similarity [22]. The UK and Italy 
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require 16, while Brazil and Argentina require not less than 30 Nonetheless, it is obvious that 
the more minutiae points exist, the more accurate the identification process will be.  
 
 
3. Evaluation 
The strengths and weaknesses of the proposed technique were investigated with 
regards to invisibility, robustness against various image processing attacks and possible 
detection using Steganalysis tools. Although, five test images were used for test purposes, this 
section will only discuss, and display detailed results based on one fingerprint image (fingerprint 
one). However, the results from the additional four fingerprint images will occasionally be 
referred to, and compared with the results of fingerprint one. 
 
3.1 Image Database 
To allow for a fair comparison regarding results, it is important that any steganographic 
software is tested on many different images. We used the FVC (Fingerprint Verification 
Competition) dataset which includes four disjoint fingerprint databases (DB1, DB2, DB3, and 
DB4). Five test images were used, each of size 512x512 pixels. They will be referred to as 
fingerprint one, two, three, four and five as illustrated in Figure 7. A facial image from the Yale 
Face Database B [12] will be embedded within each fingerprint image. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Fingerprint images and watermark face image 
 
 
3.2 Minutia Extraction 
Before the embedding process, five test images were loaded into our minutia extraction 
GUI. As mentioned earlier, it is important that minutiae are not severely harmed whilst 
embedding the facial watermark. Table 2 summarises the number of minutiae extracted from 
each fingerprint image prior to embedding. The number of bifurcations and terminations are 
given for each individual image. 
 
 
Table 2. Minutiae extracted from five fingerprint images before embedding 
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Considering the extracted minutia, it is observed that the amount of bifurcations and 
terminations vary. Fingerprint one has only twelve bifurcation points whereas fingerprint three 
has fifty. This is because each fingerprint has its own unique pattern hence no two fingerprints 
can have identical minutiae.  
 
3.3 Image Quality Analysis  
After the embedding procedure, a visual examination of each image was completed in 
order to determine variations between the original image and the stego image. As shown in 
Figure 8 the original image is “Fingerprint1.bmp” and the stego image is “Stego Image.bmp”. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. The original “fingerprint” and “fingerprint” images after the hybrid steganographic 
technique is executed 
 
 
A cohort of eight was used for testing. Each person was given one minute to study the 
two images. Any evidence or indication that data was hidden, such as the file names below 
each image were removed prior to viewing. After studying the images, each person was asked if 
any differences were noticeable between the two images and if so to point them out. Six out of 
the eight individuals thought that the two images were the same, whilst the other two persons 
were uncertain and believed that the two images were different. However, when both were 
asked to highlight the differences, they were unable to do so without hesitation. Succeeding the 
above subjective test, the PSNR and SSIM were then calculated. Both tests were computed by 
comparison between two images, the original image and the stego image. A PSNR value over 
38 decibels means that there are no noticeable differences between the two images being 
compared. If the SSIM test outputs a value of 1, this means the two compared images are 
identical. Table 3 gives a summary of results of PSNR and SSIM value for images all containing 
the watermark. 
 
 
Table 3. PSNR and SSIM results for images all containing the watermark 
 
 
 
There are only slight differences in each PSNR value, for each image. For example, the 
highest PSNR value is 54.38 and the lowest is 51.48. The calculated PSNR for each image is 
high which therefore indicates that all images are of good quality after embedding. The SSIM 
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values are all around 0.99, which indicates that there are no considerable differences between 
the original image and the stego image, even though data was embedded. The comparison of 
results, regardless of using different fingerprint images implies that the proposed hybrid 
technique should stay invisible regardless of the type of fingerprint image used. 
 
3.4 Robustness Analysis 
This section will evaluate the survival of the embedded watermark after attacks are 
carried out on the ‘fingerprint one’. The Normalized Cross Correlation (NCC) value is calculated 
to assess the distortion of the embedded watermark after each attack. JPEG Compression is a 
widely used technique for digital image compression therefore any steganography system 
should have some degree of durability toward compression algorithms. JPEG Compression is 
applied to the image ‘fingerprint one’ using different quality factors. For example, applying 5% of 
compression means that the image has a quality factor of 95%, meaning the image has a data 
loss of 5% and maintains 95% of its original detail. Table 4 gives a summary of results. 
 
 
Table 4. Data survival after of the embedded watermark after JPEG compression is applied at 
various quality levels 
Compression 
% 
Normalized Cross 
Correlation (NCC)Value 
Extracted Data After JPEG Compression 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
0.87 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
0.49 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
0.42 
 
 
 
The NCC value shows that the extracted watermark deteriorates after a higher level of 
compression is applied. However, the watermark is still clearly recognisable even after 100% of 
compression (0% JPEG quality factor). This test was also carried out on four other fingerprint 
images. The results are similar to the above. Based on these results, the proposed method is 
robust against all quality levels of JPEG compression. 
JPEG2000 is another compression method that uses wavelets as opposed to DCT. 
After applying different levels of compression the NCC value only changes slightly. Data 
extracted after 10% of compression (90% JPEG 2000 quality factor) is almost identical to data 
extracted after 95% of applied compression (5% JPEG 2000 quality factor).  
Two types of noise (Salt and Pepper and Gaussian noise) were added to the stego 
image. However, the NCC value confirms that the addition of noise has somewhat affected the 
watermark quality. Although the image quality is slightly flawed, the facial image is still 
identifiable. Results for the other fingerprint images were similar. 
Rotating an image, even a tiny amount (0.1 degree), clockwise or anti-clockwise can be 
enough to disrupt the whole bit map thus may cause embedded data to be lost. The facial 
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watermark survives rotation degrees between -1 and 1. The image quality is partially distorted 
however it is still very distinguishable after all attacks. Therefore it can be concluded that the 
proposed method is resistant to above rotation attacks. 
Image cropping is a lossy procedure often used in real life. Here, three different sizes of 
cropping are applied to the stego image, respectively using MATLAB’s ‘imcrop’ function. This 
function crops the fingerprint image by the size and position of the rectangle specified (i.e. 
rectangle is a four-element position vector [xmin ymin width height]. The results show that the 
proposed algorithm is resistant against some cropping attacks.  
A common manipulation in digital images is median filtering. The median filter is a non-
linear spatial filter which is often used to eliminate noise spikes from an image. Here the facial 
features of the watermark are still clearly recognizable after the above filtering attacks has been 
applied. Therefore we can say that the proposed steganography algorithm is robust against 
median filtering. 
 
3.5 Minutiae Analysis 
It is important that the data embedding process does not seriously alter the minutia 
points in the fingerprint image. Table 5 shows results of fingerprint minutiae extracted based on 
the five fingerprint images, pre and post data embedding. Bifurcation points is denoted as B and 
termination points as T.  
 
 
Table 5. Minutia extraction results for pre and post data embedding 
Image Name Original Image 
   B        T 
Stego Image 
  B        T 
Fingerprint one   12       33   10       32 
Fingerprint two   42       26   38       26 
Fingerprint three   50       34   43       32 
Fingerprint four   38       31   38       31 
Fingerprint five   22       40   21       40 
Note: Bifurcation points is denoted as B and termination points as T  
 
 
Based on comparison of the minutiae results, before and after the data embedding, it 
can be concluded that some minutiae points have been affected slightly. For example, 
‘fingerprint one’ lost two bifurcation points and one termination point, minutiae in the remaining 
images have also been somewhat modified, fingerprint four being the exception, with no minutia 
loss. No standard number of minutia is required in order to make a positive identification. 
However, the number of minutia points required vary from country to country, with Brazil and 
Argentina requiring the highest amount (minimum of 30 points). Based on this knowledge, it is 
reasonable to assume that the proposed data embedding algorithm did not corrupt the 
fingerprint minutiae to an extent that it would interfere with the identification process.  
In order to fully test the durability of minutiae, the extraction process is also carried out 
on stego images that have been attacked by JPEG and JPEG2000 compression, noise addition, 
filtering, and geometric attacks. Although, five test images have been used for experimentation, 
only results based on ‘fingerprint one’ will be presented here. The attacked images will be 
named based on the attack applied to them. So for example, an image attacked with JPEG 
compression will be denoted as ‘JPEG5%, 5% signifying the image quality factor. Or, an image 
attacked with salt and pepper noise will be listed as ‘salt & pepper20%, 20% meaning 20% of 
image pixels were modified. Similar to above, bifurcation points are denoted as B and 
termination points as T. Table 6 shows results for minutia extracted from attacked images, 
minutia extracted from original image (i.e. fingerprint one) and minutia extracted after watermark 
is embedded into the original image (i.e. stego image).  
The results show that the fingerprint minutia is robust and can tolerate various level of 
JPEG and JPEG2000 compression. After 10% compression (quality factor of 90%) results show 
no change in minutiae. After applying a high compression rate (95%- quality factor 5%) minutia 
loss is significant however, not an adequate amount of fingerprint minutiae has been disturbed 
in the sense that it would prevent an accurate identification. As can be seen in Table 6, the 
noise attacked images has altered minutia significantly. Both Salt & pepper and Gaussian noise 
addition has resulted in additional bifurcation points being added to the image. This spurious 
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minutia may cause problems such as, extraction of false minutiae. Filtering attacks have also 
disturbed minutia features. The histogram attacked image shows a lot of additional minutiae. 
However, no addition of minutiae exists in Gaussian and median attacked images. So, it is 
reasonable to say that the two out of the three filtering attacks (Gaussian & median) would not 
prevent an accurate identification process from taking place. Geometric attacks have 
considerably modified minutia points. However, extracting valid minutia from the resized image 
(200x200) may still be feasible based on the fact that only one termination point has been 
added. This cannot be said for the rotated image, as the amount of termination points has 
almost doubled. Lastly, the cropped image has lost all existing minutiae. This is no surprise, and 
is most likely due to the region of interest being excluded as a result of cropping. These results 
demonstrate that fingerprint minutia is resistant against the JPEG and JPEG2000 compression 
and also proves robust against two of the tested filtering attacks. 
 
 
Table 6. Fingerprint one minutiae survival results after attacks 
Image Name    B        T 
Extracted minutia from 
attacked images 
B       T 
Extracted minutia from original 
image (fingerprint one) 
B       T 
Extracted minutia from 
stego image 
JPEG5% 7        30 12       33 10       32 
JPEG50% 9        30 12       33 10       32 
JPEG90% 10       32 12       33 10       32 
JPEG2000 9        32 12       33 10       32 
Salt & 
pepper20% 
20       31 12       33 10       32 
Gaussian20% 13       33 12       33 10       32 
Histogram 37       26 12       33 10       32 
Median3x3 7        25 12       33 10       32 
Gaussian blur 6        32 12       33 10       32 
Resize200x200 6        33 12       33 10       32 
Rotation by 50 8        37 12       33 10       32 
Crop300x300 0         0 12       33 10       32 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
The aim was to develop a watermarking algorithm, inspired by steganography 
techniques, for digital images, to protect fingerprint biometric data in biometric security. As DWT 
and SVD transforms are used simultaneously, the fundamental advantages of both the 
transforms are obtained. General image processing techniques do not alter singular values of 
digital images thus the use of SVD makes this method more robust than the use of DWT alone. 
Noise attacks as well as image processing operations can be sustained, hence robustness is 
achieved. In this work, a hybrid data hiding algorithm which combines the DWT and SVD 
transforms has been used. After decomposing the original fingerprint image into four sub bands 
(LL, HL, LH and HH), SVD is applied to the HH band and diagonal singular value coefficients 
are modified with the singular value of the watermark itself. Subsequently, HH band coefficients 
are reconstructed with the modified singular values and lastly, the inverse DWT is applied to 
obtain the stego image. Our results show that the proposed scheme is undetectable using 
visibility checks. Moreover, the steganalysis tools used also failed to detect it. This 
demonstrates that the hybrid algorithm is undetected. Results clearly show the proposed 
techniques robustness to a considerable number of attacks, such as image processing attacks 
and many levels of geometric attacks, up to the point where any commercial value of the tested 
images are lost. The proposed method also proved durable to various levels of 
JPEG/JPEG2000 compression attacks, and according to research, the need to compress 
biometric data is essential in order to limit storage space. However, after a resizing attack of 
90% was applied the watermark deteriorated badly, and as a result did not survive this attack. 
On the aspect of preserving fingerprint features after data embedding, the fingerprint minutiae 
showed good resilience against the proposed embedding process and some attacks. Thus, 
fingerprint images were watermarked with little or no change to the features associated with 
them. Our system offers a good combination of imperceptibility and robustness for digital 
fingerprint images watermarked with a facial image using a combined method of the SVD and 
DWT transforms. In addition, the original image is not required to extract the hidden data, which 
further enhances data security. 
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